Representation of War in the Media

Representation of War in the Media CHAPTER III : CASE STUDIES â€Å"War is fought with the will of the government, competence of the armed forces and the support of the nation† Carl Von Clausewitz There is no doubt that the global reach and immediacy of the new media communications technologies and the ability to shape both national and international public opinion has made media a major player in limited conflicts. Such developments could be expected to significantly impact the way conflict is reported and debated by international community. Given the rapid progress and far reaching advances in communications over recent years, correct engagement with the media acts as a force multiplier for the commander on ground to achieve a more comprehensive success. On the other hand, the incorrect media engagement leads to loss of operational security and makes the task of the military commander much more difficult. The media representation of wars has significantly changed over last years. Previously being just an instrument of coverage and propaganda, now media are considered a competent weapon. The war of real objects is partially being replaced by the war of pictures and sounds, information war[1]. Now we shall examine few significant national and international conflicts, where the media extensively covered these operations by the Armed Forces. Some were a success story while others left much to be desired form the way the Armed Forces engage the media. The Gulf War Control of the media during the Gulf war followed the pattern that was established in the Falklands and refined in Grenada and Panama[2]. The pattern included secrecy in planning, demonisation of the enemy, exploitation of the media to enlist national and international support, and the exclusion of the media during the initial phases of the operation[3]. The resultant news vacuum was filled by official  coverage favourable to the military. Later criticisms were stonewalled. In the Gulf, the media were excluded from the planning stages of the initial deployment and the deliberations leading to the change of war aims from that of the defence of Saudi Arabia to offensive action in Kuwait. The demonisation of Saddam Hussein was used to rally national as well as international support and the media was immediately co-opted into these tasks[4]. The Gulf also demonstrated the familiar pattern of exclusion of the media from the early action, when both the military and the administration were most vulnerable[5]. Before the commencement of the hostilities, USA set up the Joint Information Bureau to handle the media from a base in Dhahran. Journalists were formed into pools or Media Reporting Teams (MRTs).Guidelines were instituted, concurrent with the arrival of the first pool of reporters[6]. Subsequent guidelines gave detailed instructions how the information could be gathered. All interviews could be conducted only in the presence of a military escort, all reports, photos and videos had to be cleared by a security review system before transmission. Beyond these measures, however, the Gulf campaign lent itself to complete media management through absolute control over the means of communication, transport and access. So powerful was this weaponry that there was no need for actual censorship[7]. Censorship was achieved primarily through denial of access and delay in transmission, backed a blanket decision not to allow media access to any event that was a strictly controlled. This was offset by a flow of favourable military sourced information to fill the vacuum created by media restriction. Material ranged from information provided at carefully controlled briefings which bypassed journalists on the spot. The combination of credibility afforded by the briefings and novelty of the new weaponry was enough to satisfy audiences[8]. The realities of war and any real analysis were foregone in favour of a politically  acceptable, sanitised war which showed nothing but success. It was evident too that  the military used the media not only to present its own policies in the best possible light, but to deceive and misinform the Iraqis. Both the administration and the military clearly benefited from this control. CNNs coverage of the 1991 Gulf War, when it became the worlds only instant chronicler of a major conflict, seemed only to confirm the formidable role played by Western news agencies in covering and framing international events. The impact of this kind of media coverage has been dubbed â€Å"the CNN effect,† referring to the widely available round-the-clock broadcasts of the Cable News Network[9]. Indeed, by the mid 1990s, some scholars and certain policymakers had come to the conclusion that CNN in particular was having a measurable impact on the way governments conduct world politics. This proactive engagement of media by the Pentagon ensured that the military remains immune from scrutiny but also garners the voter benefits for the politicians. The only caution is that this form of media containment or partial exclusion can only work for a limited period. If, as in Vietnam; and as may well have happened in the Gulf, such a limited conflict becomes protracted and involves high levels of casualties, then the ascendancy of the military may be challenged and broken as the global media brings to bear the full weight of its capacity for independent news gathering and communications. The 1991 Gulf war was the first televised war of the century wherein pictures of the night sky lit up with firing of weapons. Operation Desert Storm was the most widely and most swiftly reported war in history. In addition to being called the first â€Å"CNN War† this war also marked a turning point for the American’s view of that relationship. US demonstrated will and military potential to influence developing world in consonance of her policies.[10] The world saw the live footage of the 1991 Gulf war. CNN activities during the war were a classic example of the role that civil broadcasts and journalists can play in any future war. Media can be allowed selective access with a view to influencing the international opinion. The media enjoys the support of high technology equipment and access to credible media outlets. The CNN broadcasts provided useful inputs to put into operation diplomatic damage limitation operations to counter the fallout of adverse reports. The examp le at hand is the demonstration of her will and the military potential by the USA in influencing the world opinion, including engaging the media[11]. The first Iraqi war was totally covered by the media and the general opinion was that the media was focussing all their attention on the wars victory and retreating troops. Very few journalists looked after the Arabian people; in fact the Iraqi refugee problem was simply overlooked. In general, the media was very supportive of the American troops in the Persian Gulf. Though the reporting was positive, the coverage did not tell the absolute truth on the battle field. Journalists were more or less welcomed by the battalion commanders. The army was silent to â€Å"embedding† the media, while the Marine Corps was proactive and welcomed media attention. Public satisfaction with press coverage can be largely attributed to the increasing media savvy of the military leadership, who were able to successfully use news coverage to enhance the military’s image and win public support for its operations. General Schwarzkopf was a master at these press briefings. He analyzed the impor tance of the briefings and prepared himself mentally. He decided not to repeat the mistake made in Grenada, where the relations between media and the military had been eroded to an appalling state[12]. Kargil A Water Shed for Indian Media The Kargil conflict was India’s first real war of the information age and it was significant for the impact and the influence of the mass media on the public opinion of both the nation states[13]. During this operation, both the military and the media were interacting for the very first time in the backdrop of the technological advances made in the last two three decades or so. The Kargil news stories and war footage were often telecast live on the TV, while many websites provided in-depth analysis of the war. This conflict became the first live war in South Asia[14]. The Indian Army tried to implement the â€Å"pool† methodology of the Gulf war after consulting some reputed and esteemed media persons. There were daily briefings in Delhi through the operational staff and journalists were allowed to enter the war zone[15]. The site tours were discontinued after some time and media persons got total freedom to move around on their own except where their lives could be in danger. But unlike the Gulf war, there was to be no censoring of media reports and there was to be no deviation from the truth[16]. The military and the media did not indulge in any deliberate disinformation drive. But they effectively exposed Pakistan’s lies and disinformation tactics. The media for once highlighted defence requirements of weaponry and ammunition which otherwise do not get any significance for reporting in the normal sequence of events.[17]. The ‘Kargil War’, also brought into focus the significance of both the print and the electronic media[18]. The nation made a very clever use of the Internet and dedicated an exclusive Website www.vijayinkargil.com to show case the heroics of the Indian Army. Trained PR officers manned chat sites on the web to establish a real time inter face with the youths of the country for possibly the very first time. Television was able to invade the living rooms of the people to shape public opinion. The war received a human face because of the wide scale coverage of the war by the news channels like Aaj Tak, Zee News and NDTV Network. The media both Indian and overseas was predominantly compassionate to the Indian cause, with editorials in newspapers based in the west and other neutral countries observing that our western adversary was in principal answerable for the conflict[19]. Some analysts believe that Indian media, which was both larger in number and more credible, may have acted as a force multiplier for the Indian military operation in Kargil[20] and served as a morale booster. As the fighting intensified, the Pakistani version of events found little backing on the world stage. This helped India gain valuable diplomatic recognition for its position. Media reportage on Kargil converged around a single dramatic image of a nation at war. In the initial phase, news coverage was restrained on the logic of operational security. The Army permitted first media coverage on 15 May 1999. In Jun 1999, travel permits of press personnel were cancelled again quoting compromise of security. The failure of understanding was due to incorrect handling of media by army as well as character and content of reportage. There was a tendency to trivialise and sensationalise news by many sections of media. The semantics of reportage of certain events like return of six tortured bodies, led to a proliferation of exaggerated stories. However, media did not act as the force multiplier throughout. At crucial junctures, the over ecstatic media reported the crucial attack plans of the Indian army on the news in advance. This gave the all important operational intelligence to the adversary. The glaring example of this was the attack on Tiger Hill, where in after capture of Tiger Hill, the captured Pakistani troops revealed that they received the inputs about the Indian Army’s plans through the news channels. Also the telecast at times showed the location of the artillery gun bases, deployment areas and the logistic installations which was then suitably interpreted by the enemy to bring out effective fire on these locations. Mumbai Terrorist Attacks of 26/11 Medias reporting of terrorist activities is fast becoming critical in today’s scenario when no country is left untouched by terrorism. War on terrorism is a test for the Indian media. How much should be broadcast, whether broadcast of terrorist actions amounts to glorifying terrorism and violence and whether it incites people, creates new recruits and gives publicity to terrorists who seek to grab world attention are topics of debate across nations in the post 9/11 world. Similar debates have begun in India, more so after 26/11 Mumbai attacks. The well coordinated terror attack on Mumbai brings about essential lessons, both for the media as well as the Armed forces. The news media with a lack of understanding of where the medium can reach in such a situation, reported the move of National Security Guard (NSG) from Delhi to Mumbai being declared by the Home Minister[21]. There is increasing questioning of the medias conduct in the face of such attacks and more so after the live telecast of the 60 hour long Mumbai attacks. Concerned over the way many aspects of its operations got â€Å"jeopardized† due to live images being broadcast by TV during the 6- hour siege, the National Security Guard (NSG) pressed for restrictions on media coverage wherever its commandos are engaged to combat[22]. The case in point is the way NSGs operations at Nariman House were broadcast live. Questions were raised over the way Havaldar Gajender Singh fell to a terrorists bullet at Nariman House. As per the narration of incidents by an NSG commando â€Å"TV broadcasted our commandoes landing from a helicopter on the roof over Nariman House. By the time our men landed and started taking positions, the terrorists were already waiting for us and opened fire[23]†. In contrast the operations at Oberoi could be conducted more smoothly since TV channels were kept beyond a one-kilometer radius[24]. This zone was put under virtual curfew with no access allowed to television crews. The operations there took the least time, just under 30 hours, as compared to the other two places. As per NSG officials while terrorists holed up inside probably did not have access to live TV images on the second and third day of operations, they still had phones and were probably getting â€Å"instructions† from people watching those live images on TV. The media in turn can question the NSG that was there any spokesman of NSG to guide the media? The media showed what they saw. Can you blame them for showing what was happening? [1] Gulf War Was A Perfect Television War http://www.ukessays.com/essays/media/gulf-war-was-a-perfect-television-war-media-essay.php> [2] Young and Jesser, Loc cit, pp 280-281 [3] Ibid, pp 176 [4] Ibid [5] Ibid, pp189 [6] Ibid [7] Ibid [8] Aradhana Sharma, Journalism in Democracies during times of war: Examining the Role of Indian and US Media, Jamia Milia Islamia, New Delhi 2010 [9]The CNN Effect: Strategic Enabler or Operational Risk? Margaret H. Belknap http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/02autumn/belknap.htm [10] Brig VK Nair,VSM,Retd. War in the Gulf: Lessons For The Third World, Lancer Papers, pp 106. [11] Ibid [12] Vice Admiral J Metcalfe, The Press and the Grenada 1983, Franc Cass Co. Ltd, London pp 168 [13] Operation Vijay 1999 Victory Over Pak Treachery Col J P Singh, Retd News Bharti English 25 Jul 2014 [14] Kargil War –Wikipedia, online http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/kargil_war. [15] Kargil War –Wikipedia, online http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/kargil_war [16] Ibid. [17] Ibid. [18] Aradhana Sharma, Journalism in Democracies during times of war: Examining the Role of Indian and US Media, Jamia Milia Islamia, New Delhi 2010 [19]Article titled The Significance of the Kargil Crisis pp18-19, RAND Publications http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1450/MR1450.ch2.pdf [20] Ibid [21] Rahul K Bhonsle, Mumbai 26/11- Security Imperatives for the Future, New Delhi Vij Books (India) Pvt Ltd pp 50-51 [22] Media has Blood of NSG Commandoes http://nomadmolouges.blogspot.in/2008/12/media-has-blood-of-nsg-commando.html> [23] Ibid [24] Indian Media And War Maturity Essay http://www.ukessays.com/essays/media/indian-media-and-war-maturity-media-essay.php>

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Alexander Hamilton was a man of vision as well as economic genius. While he was Americas Secretary of Treasury, he wrote three major reports to Congress. These included: Report Relative to a Provision for the Support of Public Credit, The Reports on Public Credit II, and The Report on Manufacturers. His views expressed in these three reports laid the foundation upon which the economic success of modern day America was built. Although many of his policies have since been tweaked modified or re-named, the fundamental ideas he expressed have been consistent throughout. The amazing staying power of Alexander Hamilton's economic policies and the success that they have produced are clearly evident in today's modern economy. One of the most profound things about the visionary economic policies of Hamilton is that they not only solved the immediate problems facing the United States, but they also accounted for many of the challenges that the United States would be forced to contend with in the distant future.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚     Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  When George Washington first appointed Alexander Hamilton Secretary of Treasury, the most pressing issue was the payment of the debt acquired while financing the Revolution. He tackled this issue in his first report to Congress entitled: the Report Relative to a Provision for the Support of Public Credit. ?It is agreed on all hands, that part of the debt that has been contracted abroad, and is denominated the foreign debt, ought to be provided for, according to the precise terms of the contracts relating to it. The discussions, which can arise, therefore, will have reference essentially to the domestic part of it, or that there is not the same unanimity of sentiment on this part, as on the other.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  The Secretary has too much deference for the opinions of every part of the community, not to have observed one, which has, more than once, made its appearance in the public prints.... It involves this question, whether discrimination ought not to be made between original holders of public securities, and the present possessors, by purchase. Those who advocate a discrimination are for making full provision for the securities of the former, at their nominal value; but contend, that the latter ought to receive no more than the cost to them, and the interest: And the idea is sometimes suggested of making good the difference to the primitive possessor....   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  The Secretary, after the most mature reflection on the force of this argument, is induced reject the doctrine it contains.

The First Snowfall

The first snowfall always seems so magical to me. My first glimpse of glittering, white snowflakes brings an external burst of joy. Each tiny snowflake, from a distance, looks exactly the same. But up close, I am able to see each unique pattern these small wonders possess. They shimmer and reflect like tiny little diamonds underneath the glow of the street lamps. Floating ever so gently, down to the not-so-bare ground, a gentle breeze sends the snowflakes into a swirling dance before they resume their journey to the earth. In the distance, I can hear the shrieks and laughter of small children as they relish in pure and innocent wonder, the joys of the first snowfall. I can only imagine them grabbing up handfuls of paper-light snow and throwing it into the air, sticking their warm little tongues out to catch the frostiness of the flakes. I glance to the left of me and notice a cat huddled in the corner of a dimly lit doorway covered in a thin blanket of crystal snow, shivering miserably and letting out pathetic meows as he waits to be let into the warmth of his home. There is a cold kiss of wind against my flushed, red cheeks. And that chilly breeze sends a rushing sound through my bare, cherry-coloured ears. Tiny droplets of water, just moments ago were snowflakes, form on the base of my dark, auburn hair. I exhale sharply and watch as a brief mist forms from my warm breath, mixing with the frigid air. I hear the unmistakable piercing crunch of snow, as my boot hits the blanketed pavement. It is almost impossible to walk silently in the snow. I thoroughly enjoy the first snowfall. I stand outside and marvel at its beauty, as the earth is covered in the brightest, white blanket my eyes have ever perceived. I enjoy kicking up the lightness of the snow before it becomes heavy and hard with the burden of perpetual snowfall. I stand there and let the tiny, diamond like flakes cover me for just a moment, because I know that soon this mesmerizing snowfall will soon transform into a bitter, long, bone-chilling winter.

Doubt, a Play by John Patrick Shanley

Doubt is a drama written by John Patrick Shanley. It is about a strict nun who believes that a priest has done something terribly inappropriate to one of the students. The Setting of Doubt The play is set in the Bronx, New York in 1964, and takes place mostly in the offices of a Catholic school. Plot Overview Based upon a few circumstantial details and a lot of intuition, the stern nun, Sister Aloysius Beauvier believes that one of the priests at the St. Nicholas Catholic Church and school has been molesting a 12-year-old boy named Donald Muller, the schools only African-American student. Sister Aloysius recruits a young, naive nun (Sister James) to assist her in monitoring the suspicious yet charismatic Father Flynn. She also addresses her concerns to Donalds mother, who, surprisingly, is not horrified or even shocked by the allegations. (Mrs. Muller is more concerned about her son getting into high school and avoiding a beating from his dad.) The play concludes with a one-on-one confrontation between Sister Aloysius and Father Flynn as she attempts to get the truth out of the priest. The Character Sister Aloysius: What Does She Believe? This nun is a diligent taskmaster who firmly believes that subjects such as art and dance class are a waste of time. (She doesnt think much of history either.) She contends that good teachers are cold and cunning, creating a bit of fear within the hearts of the students. In some ways, Sister Aloysius might fit the stereotype of the angry Catholic school nun who slaps the hands of students with a ruler. However, playwright John Patrick Shanley reveals his true motives in the plays dedication: This play is dedicated to the many orders of Catholic nuns who have devoted their lives to serving others in hospitals, schools, and retirement homes. Though they have been much maligned and ridiculed, who among us has been so generous? In the spirit of the above statement, Sister Aloysius seems so harsh because she ultimately cares about the well-being of the children in her school. She is ever vigilant, as apparent in her discussion with the innocent teacher Sister James; Aloysius seems to know more about the students than the young, naive nun. Eight years before the beginning of the story, Sister Aloysius was responsible for detecting a sexual predator among the priesthood. After she went directly to the monsignor, the abusive priest was removed. (She does not indicate that the priest was arrested.) Now, Sister Aloysius suspects that Father Flynn has made a sexual advance on a 12-year-old boy. She believes that while having a private conversation, Father Flynn gave the boy wine. She doesnt state exactly what she thinks happens next, but the implication is that Father Flynn is a pedophile who must be dealt with immediately. Unfortunately, because she is a woman, she does not have the same level of authority as the priests; so instead of reporting the situation to her superiors (who will probably not listen to her), she reports her suspicions to the boys mother. During the plays finale, Aloysius and Flynn confront one another. She lies, claiming that she has heard about previous incidents from other nuns. In response to her lie/threat, Flynn resigns from the school but obtains a promotion becoming the pastor of a different institution. The Dubious Priest of Doubt The audience learns much about Father Brendan Flynn, yet most of the information is hearsay and conjecture. The early scenes which feature Flynn show him in performance mode. First, he is speaking to his congregation about dealing with a crisis of faith. His second appearance, another monologue, is delivered to the boys on the basketball team he coaches. He gives them instruction about developing a routine on the court and lectures them about their dirty fingernails. Unlike Sister Aloysius, Flynn is moderate in his beliefs about discipline and tradition. For example, Aloysius scorns the idea of secular Christmas songs such as Frosty the Snowman appearing in the churchs pageant; she argues they are about magic and therefore evil. Father Flynn, on the other hand, likes the notion of the church embracing the modern culture so that its leading members can be seen as friends and family, and not just emissaries from Rome. When he is confronted about Donald Muller and the alcohol that was on the boys breath, Father Flynn reluctantly explains that the boy was caught drinking the altar wine. Flynn promised not to punish the boy if no one else found out about the incident and if he promised not to do it again. That answer relieves the naive Sister James, but it does not satisfy Sister Aloysius. During the plays finale, when Sister Aloysius falsely tells him that nuns from other parishes have made incriminating statements, Flynn becomes very emotional. FLYNN: Am I not flesh and blood like you? Or are we just ideas and convictions. I cant say everything. Do you understand? There are things I cant say. Even if you imagine the explanation, Sister, remember there are circumstances beyond your knowledge. Even if you feel certainty, it is an emotion and not a fact. In the spirit of charity, I appeal to you. Some of these phrases, such as There are things I cant say, seem to imply a level of shame and possibly guilt. However, Father Flynn firmly claims, I have not done anything wrong. Ultimately, it is up to the audience to determine guilt or innocence, or whether or not such rulings are even possible, given the sketchy bits of evidence delivered by Shanleys drama. Did Father Flynn Do It? Is Father Flynn a child molester? The audience and readers never know. At its heart, that is the point of John Patrick Shanleys Doubt—the realization that all of our beliefs and convictions are part of a facade we build to protect ourselves. We often choose to believe in things: a persons innocence, a persons guilt, the sanctity of the church, the collective morality of society. However, the playwright argues in his preface, deep down, under the chatter we have come to a place where we know that we dont know...anything. But nobodys willing to say that. One thing seems certain by the end of the play: Father Flynn is concealing something. But who isnt?